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ABSTRACT: The in-vehicle diagnostic and software update system, which supports remote diagnostic and Over-The-Air 
(OTA) software updates, is a critical attack goal in automobiles. Adversaries can inject malicious software into vehicles or 
steal sensitive information through communication channels. Therefore, security analysis, which identifies potential security 
issues, needs to be conducted in system design. However, existing security analyses of in-vehicle systems are threat-oriented, 
which start with threat identification and assess risks by brainstorming. In this paper, a system-oriented approach is proposed 
on the basis of the System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). The proposed approach extends the original STPA from the 
perspective of data flows and is applicable for information-flow-based systems. Besides, we propose a general model for in-
vehicle diagnostic and software update systems and use it to establish a security analysis guideline. In comparison with threat-
oriented approaches, the proposed approach shifts from focusing on threats to system vulnerabilities and seems to be efficient 
to prevent the system from known or even unknown threats. Furthermore, as an extension of the STPA, which has been proven 
to be applicable to high level designs, the proposed approach can be well integrated into high-level analyses and perform co-
design in different disciplines within a unified STPA framework. 
KEYWORDS: System-oriented, Information-flow-based, Security Analysis Guideline
1. Introduction 
Connected vehicles are a big trend in the automotive industry. The 
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) innovations provide better traffic 
safety and management [1] by increasing interactions between 
vehicles and the outside world. Yet, this leads to rising security 
challenges. The in-vehicle diagnostic and software update system, 
which is an essential part of modern vehicles that supports remote 
diagnostic and OTA firmware or configuration updates, is a critical 
attack goal in automobiles. Adversaries can install malicious 
software into vehicles or steal sensitive information like business 
secrets or personal data and cause property or life losses.  
Therefore, security needs to be considered in the system lifecycle. 
Security analysis, as a key step in early design, discusses potential 
security issues and derives related items, like threats, risk 
assessment and constraints, to guide secure design. 
The purpose of this research is to propose a suitable approach for 
systematic security analysis of in-vehicle network systems and 
provide the analysis guideline for in-vehicle diagnostic and 
software update systems. The outcomes of the analysis, containing 
traceable system vulnerabilities and security constraints, would be 
the inputs of the next security design phase and helpful to migrate 
risks of being attacked. 
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we 
introduce the state of the art with identified gaps and our 
contributions. In section 3, a system model is proposed for the 
target system. Section 4 describes the optimized approach with 
analysis guideline and an example case. Section 5 discusses the 
comparison between two sorts of approaches and presents the 
highlights and outline of this research. Finally, we conclude this 
paper and propose future work in section 6.  
2. Related Work and Our Contributions 
2.1. Security analysis of vehicle diagnostic and 
software update systems 
Since diagnostics and SW update are essential functions in vehicles, 
research has been conducted to analyze security issues of these 
systems. L. C. Wei [2] performed analyses of three OTA software 
update scenarios by using two different approaches, achieved 
security requirements and concluded the merits and demerits of 
different approaches. C. Schmittner et al. [3] analyzed an OTA 
system and identified the threat mode, cause and effect, misuse or 
attacker cases. However, these analyses focus on issues at a high 
level. The vehicle, together with other entities like manufacturers 
and governments, is regarded as a component in such a socio-
technical system. Yet, crucial information from the lower levels of 
in-vehicle parts are not part of the analyses. 
As to the in-vehicle aspect, the E-safety Vehicle Intrusion Protected 
Applications (EVITA) project [4] presented its security analysis of 
various use cases by using an asset-oriented approach. It started 
with identifying system assets and threats, evaluated risks by the 
attack tree and achieved security requirements. K. Shanmugam et 
al. [5] also analyzed security issues of automobile software update 
systems by defining the threat model with attack goals and 
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capabilities first. J. Lindberg [6] identified weaknesses of the 
Diagnostic communication over Internet Protocol (DoIP) protocols 
by using the method defined in the NIST SP 800-30 standard. R. B. 
Gujanatti [7] presented an analysis of four DoIP communication 
scenarios based on two attacker types (active and passive) and 
general security attributes, like data origin authenticity, integrity 
and confidentiality. All these analyses started from the threat model 
with general security requirements.  
To sum up, the existing system-oriented analyses all focus on high-
level system views in which the vehicle is regarded as a single 
component, while the analyses for in-vehicle systems are threat-
oriented and achieve security requirements largely depending on 
brainstorming.   
2.2. Security Analysis Approaches 
The analysis approaches can be categorized into two classes. The 
first one is the component-based class, containing the Security 
Aware Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (SAHARA) and the 
Failure Mode, Vulnerabilities and Effect Analysis (FMVEA), 
which extend existing safety analysis techniques into security fields. 
These approaches start with a system decomposition and focus on 
component failures. The other class is the system-based one, 
containing the Combined Harm Assessment of Safety and Security 
for Information System (CHASSIS) and the STPA-based 
approaches, which start on a higher system level and put more 
emphasis on interactions between system components. [8]. 
STPA is a safety analysis technique based on the System-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model. Other than 
component failures, it considers hazards caused by unsafe control 
actions [9]. STPA-Sec is a security extension of STPA sharing a 
similar framework but extending it by security considerations [10]. 
Later, limitations like the lack of types of non-safety related losses 
and no guidance on identifying causal factors in the security 
domains were addressed by I. Friedberg et al. [11]. They proposed 
a new unified approach called STPA-SafeSec. F. Warg [12] also 
identified two limitations and proposed an optimized extension of 
STPA-Sec. Furthermore, STPA-Priv was proposed to deal with 
privacy issues by introducing privacy-related concepts and 
consequence into the STPA framework [13][14]. 
Some comparisons between approaches have been made. C. 
Schmittner [3] presented a case study of safety and security co-
analysis for automotive cyber-physical systems by using FMEVA 
and CHASSIS. CHASSIS is suitable for early engineering stage at 
a high level and largely relies on expert knowledge, while FMEVA 
is better for later phases with more system details and highly 
depends on system models and available information. L. C. Wei 
[15] compared the cybersecurity analyses of autonomous vehicles 
by using STPA-Sec and CHASSIS. STPA-Sec has strengths in 
analysis from socio-technical aspects and more focuses on top-
down mechanisms, while CHASSIS is based on information flows 
and care about possible activities of misusers or attackers. 
2.3. Gaps and Contributions 
Three gaps are identified. Firstly, all security analyses of in-vehicle 
systems are threat-oriented, which start with asset and threat 
identification by brainstorming. No system-oriented analysis exists. 
Secondly, the existing STPA approaches are based on system 
control structures, which do not fit well to information-flow aspects 
of systems. Thirdly, no general system models of in-vehicle 
network systems exist. Most analyses were performed on particular 
example cases and cannot be general guides. 
To fill the gaps, we propose an optimized STPA-based approach to 
perform a system-oriented security analysis for information-flow-
based systems. Besides, we propose a system model of in-vehicle 
diagnostic and software update systems based on which the 
security analysis guideline is presented. 
3. System Model 
3.1. General Description 
The vehicle diagnostic and software update system is a data 
transmission system based on in-vehicle networks like Controller 
Area Networks (CAN) and Automotive Ethernet (AE). The system 
functions can be categorized into two classes – writing and reading. 
The writing class includes reprogramming or reconfiguring 
Electronic Control Units (ECU) or triggering pre-defined control 
routines, and the reading class refers to getting stored information, 
Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTC) and working states from vehicles. 
To achieve system functions, the in-vehicle system needs to be 
linked with outside entities, like manufacturer clouds or handheld 
devices, through various communication channels like wired cable, 
local wireless channels or the Internet. The overall working 
environment is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Overall Working Environment 
3.2. Architecture 
The in-vehicle communication system consists of three kinds of 
components. The vehicle interface is the passageway between the 
system in vehicles and the outside world. The On-Board Diagnostic 
(OBD) interfaces and Telematic Control Units (TCU) are common 
interfaces in modern automobiles. Network components like 
gateways, cables and switches compose communication channels 
in vehicles. The end device plays the role as a service provider, 
which can be an ECU, a sensor or an actuator. The general system 
architecture is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 General System Architecture 
3.3. Working Situation 
Who operates the system? When and where is the system used? 
How does the system work? Various working situations affect the 
outcomes of security analyses. To achieve unified and accurate 
descriptions of use cases, working situations are categorized and 
defined in Table 1.  
Outside Entity
e.g. manufacturer cloud,
handheld device in repair 
shops or at assembling lines
In-vehicle 
Communication 
System
Communication 
Channel
e.g. wired cable, local wireless 
channel (e.g. wifi and 
bluetooth), Internet
The Overall Working Environment
Vehicle Interface
e.g. OBD interface,
telematic control unit
In-Vehicle Network 
Component
e.g. gateway, link, 
intermediate node
End Device
e.g. electronic control unit,
sensor, actuator
General In-Vehicle Communication System Architecture
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Table 1 Working Situation Category 
Class Item 
Operation Type 
Synchronous 
Asynchronous 
Working Location 
Manufacturer place 
Anywhere else 
Connection Type 
Local 
Remote 
‘Synchronous’ or ‘asynchronous’ means that data exchange 
between vehicles and the outside is performed at the same or 
different time [16]. ‘Manufacturer place’ refers to assembling lines, 
repair stations in factories or 4S shops. ‘Local’  means connections 
in Local Area Network (LAN) within a limited area (e.g. via wired 
or wireless channels), while ‘remote’ represents connections in 
Wide Area Network (WAN) (e.g. via the Internet). 
A combination of functions, architecture and working situations 
constructs a particular use case, which should be clearly defined 
before the analysis. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Overview 
The proposed analysis steps are listed as follows. 
 Step1 – Analyze System-level Concepts: Identify system-
level losses and hazards. 
 Step 2 – Construct Functional Interaction Structure (FIS): 
Identify system functions and responsibilities, and then 
construct the system FIS. 
 Step3 – Analyze Insecure Factors: Identify Insecure Function 
Behaviors (IFB) and Loss Scenarios (LS), and finally derive 
system security constraints. 
The main difference between the proposed approach and the 
original STPA is to use FIS, instead of the Functional Control 
Structure (FCS), since it is hard to derive control structures in 
information-flow-intensive systems. The new FIS is suitable for 
information systems at both system and component levels and can 
show physical locations of functions. Besides, new instructors (e.g 
‘calling behaviors’ in Table 6) are proposed for LS identification. 
The basic element of the FIS is ‘Function’ (shown in Figure 3). A 
function works based on inputs and its algorithm and produces 
outputs. The function behaviors are affected by the environment. 
Inputs and outputs, instead of control actions and feedbacks in 
FCSs, are interaction behaviors in the FIS. 
 
Figure 3 Function - Basic Element in FISs 
4.2. Analysis Guideline 
A guideline for analyzing the in-vehicle communication system is 
presented in this section. The scope of this analysis only includes 
information security issues. Therefore, we assume that the system 
can work properly without intended external disturbances. In other 
words, system development errors and hardware random failures 
are out of the scope of this analysis. 
4.2.1.  Step 1 - Analyze System-level Concept 
Firstly, high-level losses are identified in Table 2 according to 
definitions of safety and security in various industry standards.  
Table 2 Identified Losses at High Level 
Index Loss Description 
L-1 
Loss of life 
or cause 
injury to life 
Human and animal life in or 
outside vehicles 
L-2 
Loss of 
physical 
property 
Physical objects belonging to 
stakeholders (e.g. vehicles, 
components etc.) 
L-3 
Loss of non-
physical 
property 
Virtual property belonging to 
stakeholders (e.g. sensitive 
information, user satisfaction etc.) 
L-4 Loss of environment 
Natural or artificial world 
environments 
Then, system-level hazards are identified based on proper security 
models like the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) 
Triad. Identified hazards are listed in Table 3 with linked losses. 
Table 3 Identified System-level Hazards 
Index Hazard Linked Loss 
H-1 System leaks sensitive information. L-3 
H-2 System uses intended modified data 
without detected. L-1/2/3/4 
H-3 System fails to accomplish missions. L-3 
H-4 System works with unauthenticated 
devices. L-1/2/3/4 
4.2.2.  Step 2 - Construct FIS 
In this step, the target system is analyzed and the FIS is created. 
Based on the proposed system model, the vehicle interface, as the 
gate of in-vehicle systems, is responsible for data check, 
transforming and transmission. The network links include any 
intermediate entities in networks, whose responsibility is to 
transmit data. The end device is the communication target in the 
system, which are responsible for data check, request decapsulation, 
response encapsulation and providing services. Then, the FIS at the 
system level is drawn as in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 FIS of the Target System  
4.2.3.  Step 3 - Analyze Insecure Factors 
The first sub-step is to identify IFBs, which are behaviors of a 
function that may cause insecure scenarios and lead to hazards in a 
particular context like a worst-case environment. Similar to the 
methods in the STPA approach, three sorts of situations are 
considered and listed in Table 4 with identification instructors. 17 
identified IFBs are then presented in Table 5. 
Alogrithm
Fucntion
Inputs Outputs
Environment
System Boundary
Vehicle Interface
(VI)
End Device (ED)Intermediate 
Network Links
transmission 
on in-vehicle 
networks
validation 
check
request 
decapsulation
validation 
check
service 
process
response 
encapsulation
data from 
outside
Ou
ts
id
e 
En
tit
y
transformed  
data outwards
data 
inwards
request
response
encapsulated data to 
in-vehicle networks
validated data
validated 
datadata 
transforming
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Table 4 Identification Instructors for IFBs 
Not Providing 
Causes Hazard 
(NPCH) 
Providing Causes Hazard 
(PCH) 
Timing 
Issue (TI) 
- Not called 
- Called but 
not executed 
successfully 
- With incorrect data input  
- With improper algorithm  
- With information leakage 
risk 
- Violate 
time limit 
Table 5 IFBs of the Target System 
Function NPCH PCH TI 
Data Check (in VI1 & ED2) IFB-1 IFB-2/3 IFB-4 
Data Transforming (in VI), 
Request Decapsulation &  
Response Encapsulation (in ED) 
/ IFB- 5/6 
IFB- 
7 
Data Transmission (on links) IFB- 8 
IFB-
9/10/11 
IFB-
12 
Service Process (in ED) IFB-13 
IFB-
14/15/16 
IFB-
17 
IFB-n Description with linked hazards 
IFB-1: Data check is bypassed and outputs a fake OK. [H-2/4] 
IFB-2: Unauthenticated or modified data are not detected.[ H-
2/4] 
IFB-3: Correct data are input, but outputs a fake NOK. [H-3] 
IFB-4: Data check process takes too long and leads to violation 
of timing. [H-3]  
IFB-5: Unauthenticated or modified data are transformed, 
decapsulated or encapsulated. [H-2/4] 
IFB-6: Data are transformed, decapsulated or encapsulated by 
using malicious algorithms, which may cause insecure 
behaviors (e.g. modify original information). [H-2/3/4]  
IFB-7: Data transformation, decapsulation or encapsulation 
takes too long and lead to the violation of timing. [H-3]  
IFB-8: Data fail to be transmitted to networks. [H-3] 
IFB-9: Unauthenticated or modified data are transmitted. [H-
2/4] 
IFB-10: Data are modified during the transmission. [H-2] 
IFB-11: Data are transmitted with information leakage risks. 
[H-1] 
IFB-12: Data transmission takes too long and leads to the 
violation of timing. [H-3]  
IFB-13: Service is requested but not executed correctly. [H-3]  
IFB-14: Service is processed with unauthenticated or modified 
data (e.g. requests from unauthenticated parties). [H-2/4]  
IFB-15: Service is processed with incorrect algorithms, which 
may cause insecure behaviors (e.g. bypassing real processes 
and reply a faked response). [H-3]  
IFB-16: Service is processed with information leakage risks. 
[H-1]  
IFB-17: Service process takes too long and leads to violation 
of timing. [H-3] 
1 VI represents the vehicle interface.  
2 ED represents the end device. 
Then, LSs are discussed, which describes causal factors that may 
lead to IFBs and cause losses. 23 general loss scenarios are 
identified in Table 6 with identification instructors.  
Finally, system constraints are derived in two ways. The one is 
simply to invert LSs, and the other is to define system reactions 
when LSs occur to minimize losses [9]. For example, the system 
constraint from LS-1 is ‘SC-1: the data check must not be bypassed’ 
and ‘SC-2: if the check is bypassed, it must be detected and 
aborted’. LS-1 also explores a system vulnerability that the check 
process has the risk of being bypassed. The system constraints, as 
the outcomes of the security analysis phase, help designers pay 
more attention to system weaknesses. 
Table 6 LSs of the Target System 
IFB 
Index 
Itself Environment 
A
lg
or
ith
m
 
In
pu
t  
Ca
lli
ng
 
Be
ha
vi
or
 
Co
m
pu
tin
g 
Re
so
ur
ce
 
O
n 
Li
nk
 
IFB-1 / / LS-1 / / 
IFB-2 LS-2 / / / / 
IFB-3 LS-3 / / / / 
IFB-4 LS-4 / / LS-5 / 
IFB-5 / LS-6 / / / 
IFB-6 LS-7 / / / / 
IFB-7 LS-8 / / LS-9 / 
IFB-8 / / / / LS-10 
IFB-9 / LS-11 / / / 
IFB-10 / / / / LS-12 
IFB-11 LS-13 / / / LS-14 
IFB-12 / / / / LS-15 
IFB-13 LS-16 LS-17 / / LS-18 
IFB-14 / LS-19 / / / 
IFB-15 LS-20 / / / / 
IFB-16 LS-21 / / / / 
IFB-17 LS-22 / / LS-23 / 
LS-n Description 
LS-1: Data check is bypassed, and a fake OK result is output. 
LS-2: No or inadequate algorithm is used to check the 
authenticity and integrity of the data.  
LS-3: The algorithm is modified, and a fake NOK is output. 
LS-4: The algorithm is modified and requires more computing 
resources. 
LS-5: The adversary occupies computing resources and makes 
it not enough for the target function. 
LS-6: Unauthenticated or modified data are not detected before 
and input to transform. 
LS-7: The algorithm is modified for malicious purposes.  
LS-8: The algorithm is modified and requires more computing 
resources. 
LS-9: The adversary occupies computing resources and makes 
it not enough for the function. 
LS-10: Transmission is interrupted intendedly by causing errors 
on the networks (e.g. broken or shorten links). 
LS-11: Unauthenticated or modified data are not detected before 
and input to transmit. 
LS-12: Data is modified when transmitting on links (e.g. man-
in-the-middle attack).  
LS-13: No or inadequate anti-leakage algorithm is used for data 
transmission. 
LS-14: Links are not protected, the adversary can get access to 
data on links.  
LS-15: Transmission is slowed down by additional mechanisms 
on links (e.g. additional switches).  
LS-16: The algorithm is modified to reject legal requests.  
LS-17: Modified system states are input, which makes the 
system think that the service pre-conditions are not met.  
LS-18: Service requests are blocked on links. 
LS-19: Unauthenticated or modified data are not detected and 
input as requested service data. 
LS-20: The algorithm is modified for malicious purposes. 
LS-21: No or inadequate anti-leakage algorithm is used for data 
transmission.  
LS-22: The algorithm is modified and requires more computing 
resources. 
LS-23: The adversary occupies computing resources and 
makes it not enough for the function. 
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4.3. Concept Traceability 
All concepts in the proposed approach are traceable and linked with 
each other, which helps to review the security analysis and provide 
evidence for a proper design process. Referring to the traceability 
diagram in [9], the diagram of the proposed approach is shown in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 Traceability of the Proposed Approach 
4.4. An Example Case 
Section 4.2 presents the guideline for analyzing in-vehicle network 
systems. For designing a particular system, a more concrete 
analysis should be conducted. This section shows how to use the 
guideline to achieve refined results. 
Firstly, a particular use case needs to be defined. Figure 6 shows a 
simplified domain-based in-vehicle communication system, whose 
purpose is to update software of the Domain Control Unit (DCU) 
#1. This use case is assumed to be synchronous type and happen at 
manufacturer places, which means the attacker may be the insider 
and have basic knowledge and time to perform attacks. The 
connection type has no impact on this analysis and are is not care. 
 
Figure 6 System Architecture of the Example Use Case 
Since the first step is performed at a high system level, losses and 
hazards in particular cases are normally the same as listed in the 
guideline (in Table 2 and Table 3). This particular analysis starts 
from Step 2, in which concrete functions of each component are 
listed with corresponding IFBs in Table 7.  
Table 7 Functions (F) with IFBs of the Example Case 
F in 
VI 
F on 
Link 
F in 
ED NPCH PCH TI 
F-1  F-4 IFB-1 IFB-2/3 IFB-4 
F-2  F-5 / IFB-5/6 IFB-7 
 F-3  IFB-8 IFB-9/ 10 IFB-11 
  F-6 IFB-12 IFB-13/14/15/ 16 IFB-17 
Functions Description 
F-1: Check Data function in VI 
F-2: Transform Data  function in VI 
F-3: Transmit Data function on links 
F-4: Check Data function in ED 
F-5: De/Encapsulate Requests/Responses function in ED 
F-6: Process Service function in ED 
Then, function-related LSs are identified and described with more 
details. Some example LSs for F-1 are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 Example Loss Scenarios 
F IFB LS 
F-
1:
 C
he
ck
 D
at
a 
Fu
nc
tio
n 
in
 V
I 
F -
1_
IF
B -
2.
1:
 M
od
ifi
ed
 d
at
a 
ar
e 
no
t d
et
ec
te
d 
an
d 
ou
tp
ut
 a
n 
O
K
 
re
su
lt .
 [H
-2
]  
F-1_IFB-2.1_LS-2.1: No algorithm is used to 
check data integrity. The modified data are 
faked to be correct data and transmitted into 
the system. 
F-1_IFB-2.1_LS-2.2: The existing algorithm 
for data integrity check is not good enough. 
The well-faked input data can cheat the 
system and output an ‘ok’ result. 
F-1_IFB-2.1_LS-2.3: The original vehicle 
interface  is replaced by a fake interface with 
no or broken algorithm of the data integrity 
check, which let the modified data be 
transmitted into the system. 
Finally, the system constraints (shown in Table 9) are derived from 
LSs with traceable labels. 
Table 9 Example System Constraints 
Index System Constraint Linked LS 
SC-1 
Adequate algorithm for data 
integrity check must be used in the 
vehicle interface. 
F-1_IFB-
2.1_LS-2.1/2.2 
SC-2 
The vehicle interface must be 
protected from being replaced by a 
fake interface. 
F-1_IFB-
2.1_LS-2.3 
SC-3 
If the modified data passes the 
check in the vehicle interface, it 
must be detected and recorded 
anywhere else, and the service must 
be aborted. 
F-1_IFB-
2.1_LS-2.1/2.2 
SC-4 
If the vehicle interface has been 
replaced by a fake one, it must be 
detected. The system must reject 
providing services with insecure 
components. 
F-1_IFB-
2.1_LS-2.3 
5. Discussion 
To find differences between the system-oriented approach and the 
threat-oriented one, we compared the presented guideline and the 
analysis outcomes by using the EVITA threat-oriented method. 
The attack tree of an OBD flashing use case was reported with five 
identified attack objects and ten attack methods [4]. By comparing, 
we found that all attack methods in the EVITA can be mapped to 
one or more similar LSs in our guideline. By contrast, some kinds 
of LSs like LS-1 and LS-7 cannot be interpreted by EVITA outputs. 
Besides, the proposed approach also reveals relationships between 
concepts with traceable analysis paths (see Figure 5), while the 
EVITA one uses brainstorms based on expert knowledge and hard 
to find logical links between identified objects or attack methods.  
The most significant feature of this STPA-based approach is the 
paradigm shift from focusing on threats to system vulnerabilities. 
The external threats cannot be controlled by the designer but the 
internal system weaknesses can, which makes it more efficient to 
protect the system from known or even unknown threats. Besides, 
several STPA extensions have been proposed in different fields. 
Therefore, the proposed approach can be well integrated with other 
STPA-based approaches and perform co-analysis in multi-
System-level
Loss
System-level
Hazard Functional Interaction Structure
Insecure Function Behavior
Loss Scenario
System Constraint
System Definition (function, 
architecture, working situation)
Component & 
Function Responsibility
Definition in 
Standards
DCU #4
DCU #2 DCU #3
Central Gateway (VI)
DCU #1 (ED)
ECU #1…
ECU #n
wired or wireless 
connection
CAN Bus
External Test 
Equipment 
(Outside Entity)
Ethernet Link
Note: only grey boxes 
are relevant to the 
example case.
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disciplines. Furthermore, STPA has been proven to be useful at 
analyzing high system levels, therefore using a similar framework 
during the whole system design, from the high level to the lower 
one, would make the work process simpler and outcomes could 
have strong links with each other. 
The general idea of this research is to use the optimized STPA-
based approach to analyze security issues of a sort of systems, 
which is the in-vehicle diagnostic and software update system, and 
provide a security analysis guideline for this class. The presented 
guideline with instructors can guide the analysis of a real system in 
practice. The outline of the research idea is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Research Outline 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we proposed a system-oriented approach for security 
analysis of in-vehicle communication systems and a guideline for 
diagnostic and software update use cases. Current research states 
were introduced, and an example was presented to show how to use 
the approach. Finally, we conducted a comparison between system- 
and threat-oriented analyses, highlighted the merits of the proposed 
approach and presented the general research outline. 
Two works have been planned for future researches. Firstly, more 
particular analyses of industry cases will be performed to exploit 
approach weaknesses in practice and make it more operable and 
suitable for real situations. Secondly, we will use this approach to 
analyze other information-based systems in vehicles, like 
infotainment system and Advanced Driver Assistance Systems 
(ADAS) to extend the applicability of the approach and also 
propose security design guideline for other key systems in vehicles. 
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